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Abstract—Cyber-physical systems have dependability requirements that
are associated with controlling a physical process. Cyber-attacks can
result in those requirements not being met. Consequently, it is important
to monitor a cyber-physical system, in order to identify deviations from
normal operation. A major challenge is inferring the cause of these
deviations in a trustworthy manner. This is necessary to support the
implementation of correct and timely control decisions, in order to
mitigate cyber-attacks and other causes of reduced dependability. This
work presents evidential networks as a solution to this problem. Through
the evaluation of a representative use-case for cyber-physical control
systems, this work shows novel approaches to integrate low-level sensors
of different types, in particular those for cyber-attack detection, and
reliabilities into evidential networks. The results presented indicate that
evidential networks can identify system states with an accuracy that
is comparable to approaches that use classical Bayesian probabilities
to describe causality. However, in addition, evidential networks provide
information about the uncertainty of a derived system state, which is
a significant benefit, as it can be used to build trust in the results of
automatic reasoning systems.
1 Introduction
As cyber-physical systems (CPS), such as the smart grid, rely
increasingly on information and communication technology
(ICT) the effects of cyber-attacks can directly influence the
operation of physical processes. One severe threat is the
unauthorized and undetected manipulation of sensor mea-
surements. A successful attack can cause incorrect decisions
by operators or control algorithms, if the estimated system
state is based on manipulated measurement values and is
therefore incorrect [1]. Similarly, an attacker could also inject
malicious control commands that cause unexpected behaviour
in the physical part of the system [2]. Control decisions in CPS
can be very time sensitive [3]. Therefore, monitoring data
needs to be analyzed automatically to support the decision
making process by providing state awareness [4]. State aware-
ness requires a holistic approach, in the sense that malicious,
erroneous and normal system states are considered of equal
importance. This work shows that evidential networks are a
solution that can infer system states accurately.
An evidential network (EN) [5] is a graph structure that
encodes knowledge about variables in a system and the rela-
tionship between these variables. The information is encoded
in belief structures based on Dempster-Shafer Theory [6]. Pre-
vious approaches in the cyber-security domain that leverage
data from multiple sensors focus on the detection of malicious
behavior. The correct classification of normal or erroneous
behavior is of limited relevance. Alert correlation [7] is one
such approach that focuses on the reduction of false positives
and the correlation of multiple alerts about single attacks
that form one multi-stage attack. In this work, it is proposed
that the reasoning unit that provides state awareness needs to
answer a question about causality. Given a set of (correlated
or not) sensor information, the system needs to identify the
system state that is caused by the underlying events. In
return, this requires an approach that allows the integration of
sensor evidence of various types of sensors. Intrusion detection
systems (IDS) and other cyber-security sensors have to be
analyzed and combined with sensor information from the
physical domain, in order to distinguish different states.
Another problem is that different types of sensors not
only provide different data, they also operate with different
reliability. This introduces uncertainty to the data provided
by sensors; an aspect that is usually not considered in existing
correlation approaches, but is critical for inference. Eviden-
tial networks are explicitly designed to handle uncertainty.
Further, they have been successfully applied in the fields of
threat assessment (see Benavoli et al. [8]), system reliability
evaluation (see Simon et al. [9]) or activity recognition in
smart homes (see Hong et al. [10]). This use in different
application areas shows the general applicability of evidential
networks. However, only limited work was dedicated to the
use of evidential networks in the field of cyber-security and
state inference in cyber-physical systems [11], [12], [13].
This work discusses the use of evidential networks to
accurately infer all types of system states (not only cyber-
attacks) by reasoning about sensor evidence from the cyber-
security domain and the physical system. This is a necessity
for operators and control algorithms that ensure dependable
operation under the threat of cyber-attacks in CPS. The
contributions of this work are:
• The presentation of evidential networks as a solution
to the problem of state inference. Compared to existing
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solutions, our approach does not prioritize the detec-
tion of malicious behavior, but considers normal and
erroneous states of equal importance.
• A detailed analysis about the accurate integration of
sensor evidence from different types of sensors, given
a-priori knowledge about the sensor’s reliability.
• The implementation of an evidential network for state
inference in a real-world smart grid use-case that is
representative of similar cyber-physical systems. This
shows the applicability of evidential networks to real
world problems more clearly than related work [11],
[14], where abstract attack vectors are analyzed.
• A comparative evaluation of the proposed EN and
considerations presented by Zomlot et al. [11] and
Ou et al. [15]. The results show that some claims in
the related work lead to high false positive rates and
inaccurate detection when multiple system states are
considered; something that this work improves upon.
• An evaluation of evidential networks compared to
widely-used Bayesian network approaches, which
shows that erroneous states can be detected much
more accurately with the use of evidential networks. At
the same time, evidential networks provide additional
information about the level of trust that should be
placed in the results through the remaining uncer-
tainty.
2 Related Work
To overcome the problems that arise with the number of
low level alerts generated by traditional intrusion detection
systems [16], [17], [18] alert correlation [7], [19], [20] is pro-
posed. The goals of alert correlation are (i) to identify the
alerts that can be filtered out, (ii) to group alerts to make
them easier to analyze and (iii) to prioritize these groups
of alerts to minimize the response time to the most critical
issues [7]. A problem with correlation is that it cannot provide
information about the causality between the sensor evidence
(e.g. alerts, physical sensor readings, etc.) and the current
system state. The question asked by operators however is,
what each piece of evidence implies about the system state.
Another shortcoming of many alert correlation approaches is
that the type of information that is correlated is limited. Zhai
et al. [21] identified this problem and presented a reasoning
approach based on complementary intrusion evidence. Their
work combines intrusion evidence from different sources (e.g.
malware scanners, host information and network data), to
reason about the progress of a cyber attack. The presented
reasoning approach adopts the concepts of state-based and
event-based evidence; an attack requires the system to be
in a certain state which can be an indicator for previously
missed event-based evidence and vice versa. For the security
of cyber-physical systems, the concept of complementary
evidence needs to be extended to include evidence from the
physical domain. Another shortcoming of the approach is
the focus on attack states. In cyber-physical systems, certain
alerts can be caused by erroneous behavior (e.g. a component
fault). Consequently, the exclusive consideration of intrusion
detection systems and data about malicious behavior results
in a limited ability to differentiate between system errors and
malicious actions.
Squicciarini et al. [14] aim to achieve situational aware-
ness by reasoning about network incidents with a tool called
ReasONets. ReasONets aims to detect incidents with the use
of machine learning and anomaly detection after which a
case based reasoning unit tries to infer the indicated system
state. The reasoning unit leverages Fuzzy Logic Theory to
handle uncertainty in the system. The approach limits its
potential with the focus on a self designed anomaly detec-
tion component as the only source of information about the
monitored system. Anomaly detection approaches produce
high false positive rates and cannot match the accuracy
of signature based detection mechanisms when it comes to
known attacks [16]. Given the amount intrusion detection
solutions that are already deployed and used successfully,
event inference needs to be able to integrate existing solutions
to improve acceptance. Considerations about the need for
uncertainty in the context of intrusion detection were also
investigated by Ou et al. [15]. Their work was later picked
up by Zomlot et al. [11] who apply Dempster-Schafer theory
to alert correlation which is highly relevant in the context
of this work. Their approach introduces many thoughts on
the applicability of DS theory in the context of cyber-attacks.
These concepts will be thoroughly discussed and evaluated in
more detail throughout this work.
Dempster-Schafer theory in general, and evidential net-
works specifically are very suitable for reasoning about com-
plementary evidence from sensors in different domains. This
was recently shown in the context of smart homes [10],
video surveillance [22], railway risk assessment [23], hazardous
material transportation [24], and threat assessment [8], with
promising results. This work shows that evidential networks
can be used to reason about the causality between diverse
low level evidence and high level system states, with high
accuracy. The novelty lies in the fact that uncertainty about
the low level evidence is taken into account and that not only
malicious but also erroneous and normal system states are
considered.
3 Problem Statement
This section introduces a physical use-case around the remote
control of photovoltaic inverters, followed by a description
of the ICT network and the sensors that are the source of
evidence. From this, a threat scenario is derived that is later
used together with the use-case in the experimental evaluation
of the proposed EN approach.
3.1 Photovoltaic Use-Case
In this work a smart grid scenario based around the control
of photovoltaic (PV) installations is considered. In a medium
or low voltage distribution grid, PV clusters are placed along
a distribution line. This line is usually connected to the main
grid through a secondary substation that manages the line’s
voltage levels. Figure 1 shows the abstract system structure.
Each PV cluster is connected to the distribution line by a
PV inverter. A PV inverter is responsible for converting the
direct current (DC) produced by the PV cells into alternating
current (AC) that can be fed into the grid infrastructure.
This conversion is performed based on a number of set-points
that control different aspects of the outgoing AC. These set-
points can be used to optimize the overall power output
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Figure 1: Overview of PV clusters on a distribution line.
of the PV cluster but also to stabilize the grid. Since the
PV inverters themselves are only aware of the local state of
the grid and not the overall status, an external controller
can be used to remotely change the set-points of the PV
inverters based on its wider system view. This concept of
a control-loop is one argument why the use-case at hand
is representative for many cyber-physical systems which are
operated with the same type of control. The integrity of this
communication is critical as manipulated set-points can have
undesired effects. One example of such an effect is the fact
that safety restrictions imposed by the PV inverter force it to
shutdown if the active power output is below 10%. In work by
Kang et al. [2], [25] the authors analyzed how manipulations
of these commands can be achieved and how they effect PV
installations. This makes the use-case very appropriate for the
evaluation of ENs because the case that set-points < 10% are
sent to the controller can arise due to various reasons; both
erroneous or malicious. This shows another aspect of the use-
case that can be found in cyber-physical systems in general.
In contrast to purely digital systems, physical components are
more prone to error states that need to be handled differently
than malicious actions. However, error states and malicious
states can manifest in similar raw evidence which makes it
challenging for a state inference system to identify the correct
causal relationships. This complexity is usually not considered
in related work where the focus is on the detection of a set of
cyber-attacks.
In order to ensure stability on a specific distribution line,
it is crucial to identify the current system state correctly. For
this scenario, four high level states are identified which need
to be accurately detected.
1) Normal: All components are working as expected.
2) Controller Error: The controller in the substation
issues erroneous commands. This can be caused by
human error or by an arbitrary fault in the control
system. However, there is no malicious intent.
3) Controller Malicious: The controller is compro-
mised and its behavior is part of a malicious agenda.
4) Control CommunicationManipulated: The con-
troller is behaving as expected, but the control com-
mands to the inverter are manipulated in the com-
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Figure 2: PV inverter control system. (Grey boxes represent com-
ponents from the physical domain; white boxes represent components
in the ICT domain. Dashed boxes highlight the sensors in the net-
work and their location. A legend about the different communication
channels in the network is given in the top right corner.)
munication network. This discrepancy is part of a
malicious agenda.
3.2 Substation ICT Network
The evaluation focuses on the substation controller and its
communication to a single PV inverter. Figure 2 shows the
network setup for the testcase. There are five network nodes
on the subnet. The two grey boxes represent systems that
relate to the physical domain; namely the Substation Control
(CTL) and the PV Inverter (INV ). The inverter is connected
to the network through a Security Gateway. By separating
critical, and often legacy equipment from direct network
access, the bridge can (i)monitor and potentially intercept all
traffic from and to the device and (ii) improve the interfaces
that the device offers by providing security features that
cannot be introduced on the device itself [26].
Further, there is a Central Security Manager and a hu-
man machine interface in the network (HMI ). The security
manager node is usually connected to a mirroring port on
the switch interfacing the local subnet with outside networks
to monitor all incoming and outgoing traffic. For visibility of
traffic within the subnet it relies on alerts triggered by other
sensors installed on the subnet. In this work we assume that
these aspects cannot be attacked directly.
3.3 Threat Scenario
For the adversary model, it is assumed that the HMI exposes
a vulnerability that is exploited by an attacker. As a conse-
quence, the adversary gains a foothold in the network which is
then used to perform reconnaissance. Subsequently INV and
CTL are identified as PV inverter and controller respectively.
The adversary then aims to shut down the PV inverter by
sending it an erroneous packet with a control command to
regulate the active power output to a value of < 10%. Internal
safety mechanisms will register this command as unsafe and
perform a shutdown of the inverter.
To get the malicious control command accepted two op-
tions are available to the attacker. First, the weaponized code
can aim to hijack the existing communication link between
controller and PV inverter by performing an ARP spoofing
attack to redirect the traffic. It will then send spoofed packets
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and block all original traffic from the controller. This is
done to circumvent any IP based whitelisting approaches
that prevent unauthorised control commands to reach the PV
inverter [2].
Alternatively, the adversary can identify a further vulner-
ability in the substation controller. By infection of the con-
troller, the adversary gains full control over the PV inverter.
3.4 Low Level Sensors
In order to detect security incidents it is assumed that gen-
eral purpose cyber-security solutions and mechanisms are
deployed in the substation network. Hosts HMI and CTL can
be considered general purpose machines. They are both mon-
itored by a separate host based IDS (HIDS) and a malware
detection unit (AV ). Furthermore, system wide sensors com-
prise a sensor monitoring network traffic for potential ARP
spoofing and a network IDS (NIDS) that monitors traffic from
and to the inverter for unexpected set-points [25]. Each sensor
can in general issue multiple types of alerts. To reason about
the information provided, each potential alert needs to be
handled separately. For example, if the installed network IDS
monitors traffic using n rules, the derived reasoning network
will contain n logical sensors where each sensor signals that a
specific alert was raised (see also [11]).
4 State Inference Methodology
This work proposes to apply the concept of evidential net-
works to identify the causality between low level sensor alerts
and higher level system states. Evidential networks are a
special form of valuation algebra [5] based on the Dempster-
Shafer (DS) theory of evidence [6]. This section will give a
brief overview of the minimal mathematical concepts required
to understand how state inference is performed.
4.1 Dempster-Shafer Theory
Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory is a mathematical theory of
evidence that constructs a coherent picture of reality through
computing the degree of belief on an event, given evidence
[6]. It does so by abstracting the represented system with
information on a set of variables V = {x1, . . . , xn}. Each
variable represents either the possible states reported by a
low level sensor or higher level information inferred about the
system. It is further defined by the following concepts:
Frame of discernment. The frame of discernment, de-
noted by Θ, is a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive
hypotheses about a problem domain (domain for the rest
of this work). A domain in DS theory is described by a set
of variables which in return describe aspects of the mod-
eled system. Consider the problem described by variable
x. Dx = {x} represents the domain of this problem. If
ΘDx = {s : s is the value of x} is the frame of discernment
for Dx (Θx in short), then the frame of discernment ΘD of an
arbitrary domain D is given as:
ΘD = ×{Θx : x ∈ D} (1)
Mass function. A mappingm : 2Θ → [0, 1] is called mass
function satisfying:∑
A⊆Θ
m(A) = 1 and m(∅) = 0. (2)
A mass function is seen as a generalized probability function,
defined on the power set of Θ rather than on Θ. Described
over a specific domain, denoted as d(m), it encodes arbitrary
information about that domain. This information can be
sensor evidence as well as information about the relationship
between the variables in the domain. A mass function provides
a richer description than a classic probability function as mass
values are on subsets of Θ. Therefore, it has the capability to
represent uncertainty, by assigning a part of the probability
to a non-singular subset of Θ.
Dempster’s rule of combination. Dempster’s rule pro-
vides a mechanism to aggregate the evidence from multiple
independent sources. Let mi be the mass function collected
from the ith source over the frame Θ. Dempster’s rule is given
as:
m(C) = (m1 ⊕ m2 ⊕ ... ⊕ mn)
= 1
K
∑
(C1∩C2∩...∩Cn)=C
m1(C1) ·m2(C2) · ... ·mn(Cn)
(3)
where K is the normalizing constant that is defined as:
K = 1−
∑
(C1∩C2∩...∩Cn)=∅
m1(C1) ·m2(C2) · ... ·mn(Cn).
4.2 Evidential Networks
An evidential network (EN) [5] is a framework for knowledge
representation and inference, by using DS theory. An ENmod-
els a real-world problem in a network of interlinked variables.
An evidential network is represented by a tuple:
EN = {V,ΘV ,MV ,⊕, ↓}
where:
• V = {x1, ..., xn} is the set of variables in the model;
• ΘV = {Θx : x ∈ V } is the set of frames of all variables;
• MV = ∪{MD : D ⊆ V } is the set of all mass functions;
• ⊕ is the combination operator;
• ↓ is the marginalisation operator.
The joint mass function of an evidential network, denoted
by ⊕M , is the combination of all mass functions in the
network. It is computed to combine the low level evidence with
the knowledge about the variable relationships to infer knowl-
edge about higher level system states. The domain of ⊕M is
the union of the domains of all MD, d(⊕M) = ∪d(MD) = V .
The frame of discernment for ⊕MD, denoted as Θ, is the
Cartesian product of all ΘD, Θ = ×ΘD. Suppose D0 ⊆ V
is the domain of our interest (i.e. the variables that denote
the system states of interest). We extract the information
of interest by computing (⊕M)↓D0 through the evidential
operations described in the next subsection.
4.3 Evidential Operations
To compute the joint mass function, two evidential operations:
vacuous extension and marginalisation [27] are applied. Let D
and D′ be two domains, D′ ⊆ D. ΘD and ΘD′ represent the
frame of discernment for D and D′ respectively.
Vacuous extension of a mass function defined on domain
D′, mD′ , to domain D is defined as:
m↑DD′ (A) =
{
mD′(B) if A = B ×ΘD\D′ ;
0 otherwise. (4)
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where D \D′ represents the complement of D′ in D.
Marginalisation is a projection of a mass function de-
fined on D, mD, into domain D′:
m↓D
′
D (B) =
∑
A⊆B×ΘD\D′
mD(A). (5)
To describe causality between variables, Domain Experts
usually give their subjective judgments in a form of IF-THEN
rule, such as “if A then B”. When uncertain knowledge is
involved, degrees of confidence measuring uncertainty have to
be attached to knowledge rules, such as “if A then B” with a
certain degree of confidence ρ ∈ [α, β], 0 ≤ α ≤ β ≤ 1. α and
β represent the minimum and maximum degree to which a
relationship is thought to hold. Such a rule is called relation
implication rule since it represents a relation between con-
ditions and a consequence. A relation implication rule with
uncertainty measures can be conceptually represented within
the framework of DS theory. Assume that DA and DB are
two disjoint domains associated with frames ΘDA and ΘDB
respectively, and ⊆ ΘDA , B ⊆ ΘDB . A relation implication
rule can be then written as:
A ⊆ ΘDA ⇒ B ⊆ ΘDBwith ρ ∈ [α, β], 0 ≤ α ≤ β ≤ 1. (6)
Using the principle of minimum commitment and the bal-
looning extension mechanism [28], [29] the above rule can
be represented by a mass function over the product space
ΘDC = ΘDB ×ΘDA on domain DC = DB ∪DA:
mDC (C) =
α if C = (B ×A) ∪ (ΘDB ×A
c);
1− β if C = (Bc ×A) ∪ (ΘDB ×Ac);
β − α if C = ΘDB ×ΘDA .
(7)
where Ac represents the complement of A in ΘDA , Bc is the
complement of B in ΘDB .
4.4 Decision Making
Belief functions cannot be directly used for decision making
[30]. Mass functions have to be transformed into a pignistic
probability distribution; its counterpart in the classical prob-
ability theory. Let mD be a mass function defined on a subset
of variables D with corresponding frame ΘD. The pignistic
transformation of mD, called the pignistic probability, is
defined for every element of the frame θ ∈ ΘD as follows [30]:
BetP (θ) =
∑
θ∈A⊆ΘD
mD(A)
|A| . (8)
where |A| stands for the total number of the elements in
A. BetP is the DS counterpart of the subjective probability
that would quantify the human’s beliefs in classical Bayesian
probabilities.
5 Evidence Fusion For State Inference
Although the mathematical concepts of evidential networks
and DS theory are well researched, limited work can be
found that analyzes the challenges in applying the framework
to concrete problems in cyber-physical systems. During this
work two main challenges were identified and are subse-
quently highlighted. First, the design of relation implication
rules needs to be supported to reduce the complexity and
Table 1: Linguistic scales for mapping design. (Amapping in the
8-element scale can translated into the other scales by merging two or
three of the dividing six scale elements.)
8-Element Scale 5-Element Scale 4-Element Scale
Probable (99%) Probable (99%) Probable (99%)
Very Likely (85%) Likely (74.5%) Likely (0.67%)Likely (71%)
Possible (57%) Possible (50%)Potentially (43%)
Possible (0.33%)Feasible (29%) Feasible (25.5%)Improbable (15%)
Unlikely (1%) Unlikely (1%) Unlikely (1%)
subsequently error probability in the design phase. Some
approaches to this challenge exist to date and we will validate
their correctness through rigorous tests. The second challenge
involves the interpretation of sensor evidence in this specific
context. This work will show that different types of sensors
need to be handled differently. Further, a-priori knowledge
about the performance and trustworthiness of sensors needs to
be handled with care and differently depending on the format
of the knowledge.
5.1 Relationship Modeling
Relation implication rules are designed based on expert
knowledge. They represent the causal relationships between
different sets of variables. Each variable either represents low
level sensor evidence or the states of higher level system
aspects. This rule design process involves two steps. First,
the relevant relationships need to be identified (define A and
B in Eq. 6); secondly, a level of belief into the represented
causality needs to be specified (define α and β in Eq. 6). The
first step is well explained in literature, and attack trees [31]
or safety analysis techniques like FMEA [32] and STPA [33]
provide repeatable processes that can be used. For the second
step however, no well established approach exists. Expert
knowledge needs to be formalized and Ou et al. [15] propose
the use of a scale to support the human rational. They argue
that α and β should be chosen from only four fixed elements.
However, no evaluation exists to show whether the reduction
of the probability range to four discrete steps limits the
expressiveness of the rules and subsequently the performance
of the evidential network. This work therefore aims to evaluate
the impact of the size of the scale on the performance of the
EN. Table 1 presents 3 different scales that divide the mapping
space into a different number of equal portions. Rules that
make use of 8 elements, can be transformed to smaller scales
as seen in Tab. 1. For example, the certainty of Improbable
is 15% in the 8-element scale, 25.5% when mapped to the
5-element scale or 33.3% in the 4-element scale. The edge
cases (Probable and Unlikely stay constant as their impact
was already evaluated by Zomlot et al. [11]. Later, Section 7
will evaluate how different scales will effect the performance
of the reasoning unit.
5.2 Sensor Evidence Integration
One critical task is the integration of sensor evidence into the
evidential network. A sensor S in our problem space can be
defined as a mapping from time t to the set of all possible mass
functions m over a domain of a single variable D = {x}. At
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any given time, the sensor provides knowledge about a specific
variable in the form of a mass function. During the design of
the evidential network, three questions have to be answered
about a sensor:
1) What type of information does the sensor provide?
2) How is the information about sensor reliability struc-
tured?
3) What is the reliability of the modeled sensor?
Reliability is defined by the IEEE 24765 Standard on Systems
and Software Engineering Vocabulary [34] as the ability of a
system or component to perform its required functions under
stated conditions for a specified period of time. The reliability
of a sensor is a measure of the sensor’s ability to interpret
the monitored aspect of the system correctly. A sensor is
denoted as a single variable in DS theory. It therefore needs
to provide information about a finite set of states. This means
that sensors which measure physical quantities (e.g. an active
power setpoint) need to be abstracted in a way that the phys-
ical measurements are interpreted under certain thresholds.
In the presented use-case the sensor interprets whether the
setpoint (which is initially an arbitrary number in the range
of 0% − 100%) is above or below the threshold of 10%; this
results in two potential states.
To answer the three questions above, this work first clas-
sifies sensors into four types by differentiating them with
regard to two aspects. With regard to the way they provide
information about the monitored system and with regard to
the type of sensor reliability. In general a sensor with a discrete
number of potential states can represent knowledge about the
system in two ways:
• Single-State Sensor The sensor provides a single
state in the domain of interest that represents the
current system state according to the sensor.
• Probabilistic Sensor Instead of a discrete state,
the sensor provides a probability distribution over the
domain of interest.
Further, sensors can be differentiated by the type of informa-
tion that is provided about a sensor’s reliability as follows.
• Deterministic Sensor Given a specific system state,
the sensor will always produce the same result. It thus
provides complete certainty that it interprets a system
correctly.
• Symmetric Sensor The sensor has a certain prob-
ability of misinterpretation. This probability is also
known as sensor reliability and it is independent of the
system state. This means, that the sensor always has
the same probability of incorrect detection.
• Asymmetric Sensor The sensor has a certain prob-
ability of misinterpretation which differs depending on
the system state that is the input to the sensor. More
specifically, the sensor might be more reliable in detect-
ing one variable state than another. This might occur
because the sensor is designed in a way to optimize
detection of one specific (probably more critical) state
at the cost of higher error rates in detecting other
states.
Each sensor can be classified by any combination of knowledge
representation and reliability structure. Strictly deterministic
sensors are effectively impossible in the real world. For very
critical sensors, reliability can be very high in specific ranges of
operation (e.g. within specific temperature ranges for physical
sensors) but most likely, it will not be guaranteed. Therefore,
deterministic sensors can be ignored for the work at hand.
Consequently, the aforementioned four types of sensors are:
single-state, symmetric (SSS) sensors, probabilistic, symmet-
ric (PS) sensors, single-state, asymmetric (SSA) sensor and
probabilistic asymmetric (PA) sensors.
In the presented use-case, an example for a SSS sensor is
a signature in an IDS that detects packets that would change
the active power setpoint to a value < 10%. There could be a
software bug or an encoding issue that limits the reliability,
but the effects on the performance would be symmetrical
(i.e. it is equally probable that a normal packet issues an
alert than it is that a suspicious packet does not trigger an
alert). In this case the reliability of the sensor can be used to
describe the uncertainty in any sensor result. In contrast, a
more complex cyber-security sensor like an antivirus scanner
would be an SSA sensor; its reliability is traditionally provided
in an asymmetric fashion. Here, true positive rate (TPR) and
false positive rate (FPR) are a widely accepted metrics to
measure sensor performance.
To use sensor evidence in evidential networks, a critical
aspect is the representation of knowledge about sensor reli-
ability with relation implication rules. In related work it is
common practice to use reliability for discounting of sensor
evidence [10], [22]. We argue, that such an approach is only
valid for sensors with symmetric reliability and gives inaccu-
rate results otherwise. More specifically, knowledge about the
reliability of a specific state of a sensor variable x should be
modeled by a set of relation implication rules from D = {x}
to D′ = {x′}. Here, x′ is a newly introduced variable that has
the same states as x but represents the sensor evidence under
consideration of the sensor’s reliability. Each rule can then be
written as
A ⊆ ΘD ⇒ A′ ⊆ ΘD′ with ρ ∈ [α, 1]
where α describes the sensor’s reliability with respect to
A. The challenge then becomes to identify α correctly. A-
priori knowledge about sensor quality is most often given in
classical probabilities. A valid use of this knowledge in DS
belief structures calls for a transfer function f that fulfills the
following conditions:
1) The fact that a sensor is in a certain state should
not strengthen the belief in the opposite state in the
resulting mass function (see Eq. 9).
2) Since we use the pignistic probability (see Eq. 8 in
Sect. 4.1) to transfer the final derived belief struc-
tures back into the classical probability domain, any
transformation (f) from the probability domain into
a belief structure should have the pignistic probability
as an inverse function (see Eq. 10).
mD(A) = γ =⇒ mD′(B) ≤ 1− γ
with A ∈ ΘD and B ⊆ ΘD′ \A
(9)
BetP (f(S)) = S (10)
Under these conditions, it is now possible to define a gen-
eral rule stating how a-priori knowledge should be translated
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to relation implication rules. Consider a variable x with n
states {x1, . . . , xn}. Let’s further assume that x represents
the actual state of the monitored system and x˜ represents
the state detected by the sensor. Given is the conditional
probability P (xi|x˜i) = α; the probability that the state of
the system equals xi if the sensor reported x˜i. The goal is to
identify a relation implication rule
x˜i ⊆ ΘD ⇒ x˜i′ ⊆ ΘD′ with ρ ∈ [α′, 1]
such that the conditions in Eq. 9 and Eq. 10 are fulfilled. The
intuitive approach would be to set α′ = α. This would fulfill
Eq. 9 because mD′(B) = 0 ∀B ⊆ ΘD′ \ x˜′i. However, in this
case BetP (mD′(x˜′i)) = α + 1−αn (see Eq. 7 and Eq. 8). To
counter this effect and ensure both conditions, the following
rule can be applied.
α′ = α− 1− α
n− 1 (11)
This equation is valid if it is possible to ensure that α′ ≥
0 which in turn means that it is only applicable to sensors
that have a reliability of α ≥ 1n for all possible states the
sensor can indicate. This happens to be the condition that
a sensor performs not worse than simple guessing. A sensor
which does not fulfill this requirement should not be used in
the first place.
5.3 Integration of Cyber-Security Sensors
Zomlot et al. [11] suggest that classical cyber security sensors
are designed only with detection in mind. As a consequence,
a sensor with two potential states xa (alert) and xn (normal),
will only be mapped by one relation implication rule from xa
to x′a. The sensors are considered completely unreliable when
they indicates xn. This approach has major implications for
the suitability of DS theory in the context of this work. In fact,
Sec. 7 will show that this approach overfits towards malicious
system states.
Instead this work presents a more generalized approach
that considers evidence in all sensor states. To evaluate the
quality of sensors, the receiver-operator characteristic (ROC)
is well established. It describes the relationship between true
positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR) of a sensor.
TPR and FPR are conditional probabilities under empirical
test results. Let X be the sensor that estimates the state of
variable x. Then the TPR and FPR are provided for each
potential variable state and are given as follows
TPR(xi) = P (x˜i|xi) (12)
FPR(xi) =
∑
j∈{1,...,n}\i
P (x˜i|xj) (13)
The ROC metric is very valuable for describing the quality
of a sensor. However, to infer higher level information, the
inverse conditional probability P (xi|x˜i) is required. It is also
known as positive predictive value (PPV) and it can easily be
computed from TPR and FPR as shown in Eq. 14.
PPV (xi) = P (xi|x˜i) = TPR
TPR+ FPR (14)
By applying Eq. 14 and Eq. 11 it is possible to derive a
set of rules that describe the trust in a sensor’s reliability
with respect to every variable state if TPR and FPR are
given. In contrast to the mapping rule proposed in [11] this
approach considers evidence for all states of the sensor which
is important to accurately detect not only malicious but also
erroneous or normal states.
6 Implementation
This section will describe the implementation of the evidential
network, based on the use-case described in Sect. 3. First,
the available sensors will be classified according to the sensor
types presented in Sect. 5.2. Based on each sensor’s reliability,
the relation implication rules for each sensor will be derived.
Afterwards, the complete evidential network is developed, the
knowledge base is defined, and the propagation process is
described in an example.
6.1 Sensor Classification
This subsection describes the sensors as they will be con-
sidered in the reasoning network, as well as their assumed
reliability. According to the problem description in Sect. 3, six
different (logical) sensors are present in the system.
• An antivirus scanner that alerts if malware is detected
at a specific host. (Sensor Type: SSA)
• A host-based intrusion detection system that triggers
if privilege escalation is detected. (Sensor Type: SSA)
• A network IDS rule that sends alerts if a packet with
an active power set-point of ≤ 10% is sent to the PV
inverter from the monitored host (i.e., the source IP is
the monitored host’s IP). (Sensor Type: SSS)
• A network IDS rule that triggers an alert if a packet
with an active power set-point ≤ 10% is received by
the PV inverter. (Sensor Type: SSS)
• An ARP traffic monitor that alerts if the monitored
host is the source of suspicious ARP traffic, or if its
MAC address is provided in the ARP payload as the
sender’s MAC address. (Sensor Type: PS)
• An ARP table monitor that alerts if the IP/MAC
mapping of the monitored host is changed or keeps
changing. (Sensor Type: SSA)
To guide the design of relation implication rules that
integrate the sensors in the evidential network, the following
a-priori knowledge about sensor performance is provided.
Where multiple reliability measures are given (namely for
the antivirus sensor and the host IDS), the sensor mappings
will be varied in Sect. 7 to evaluate the performance of the
inference approach under changing sensor reliability.
The performance of available antivirus solutions is reg-
ularly evaluated by independent organizations like AV-
Comparatives. They issue regular reports about the per-
formance of well-known antivirus solutions. Based on their
October 2016 Real-World Protection Test1, as well as their
March 2015 Heuristic / Behavior Test2, the following sensor
performance can be considered.
Vendor TPR (Real-World) TPR (Heuristics) FPR
Microsoft 95.6% 53% 3%
F − Secure 100% 93% 50%
Kaspersky 100% 92% 0%
1. https://www.av-comparatives.org/dynamic-tests/ (last
accessed 25.11.2016)
2. https://www.av-comparatives.org/retrospective-test/ (last ac-
cessed 25.11.2016)
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For the reliability of host IDS implementations, results from
work by Molina [35, p. 53] are adapted as follows.
HIDS Variant TPR FPR
Optimal 50% 2%
Realistic 30% 5%
Low 15% 10%
For the symmetric sensors, the level of uncertainty will be
described with the use of the scales presented in Sect. 5.1.
The NIDS sender sensor is assumed to likely behave correctly,
while confidence in the receivers sensor is probable. A con-
fidence of verylikely is placed on the ARP victim detector.
Finally, the ARP spoofing detector provides the probability
that a given host is the source of a specific ARP spoofing
attack. One implementation of ARP spoofing and ARP victim
sensors is ARPwatch3 – a linux command line utility. Two
sources of information provided by this sensor can be used
to identify the source of an ARP spoofing attack. The source
(src) of the spoofed ARP packet (given in the packet header)
and the value of the sender attribute in the packet payload.
By combining these two values, we design the ARP spoofing
sensor of type PS. The probability that a given host H is the
source of the spoofing is defined as
State Src = H Src 6= H
Sender = H 95% 70%
Sender 6= H 30% 0%
If the values of sender and src are both the address of host H
the probability that H is the source of the attack is quite high.
However, if the header does not point to H the probability
that H is the attacker is reduced, but it is very likely that the
attacker only tries to masquerade. However, if the payload
does not point to H the probability that H is the attacker is
low. In this case the real attacker might put a random existing
MAC address in the header to hide the real source. If both do
not point to H there is no evidence for the fact that H is the
source of the ARP spoofing traffic.
6.2 Evidential Network Model
In this section, we introduce an evidential network model that
allows us to infer the state of the system, as described in Sect.
3. Note that the node status for two different nodes (see Fig.
2) is constructed with the same subnetwork. For simplicity
we describe the variables in each subnetwork only once. If the
same variable occurs multiple times on different nodes, this
is denoted by an @ sign followed by the respective node. The
evidential network is described by the following tuple [36], [8]
EN = {V, ΘV , MV , ⊕, ↓}
in which
VH = {NS, CM, EP, SP, MW, PE,
AV, HI, NI, AR};
VS = {CS, MAN, MITM, EPR@INV, MAC@CTL,
MAC@INV, NI@INV, ARV@CTL, ARV@INV };
V = VH@HMI ∪ VH@CTL ∪ VS ;
ΘvH = {ΘNS , ΘCM , ΘEP , ΘSP , ΘMW , ΘPE ,
ΘAV , ΘHI , ΘNI , ΘAR};
3. https://linux.die.net/man/8/arpwatch
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Figure 3: System wide evidential network.(The node status of
CTL and INV expands to the same subnetwork, which is initialized
twice to form the complete network.)
ΘvS = {ΘCS , ΘMAN , ΘMITM , ΘEPR, ΘMAC ,
ΘNI , ΘARV };
Θv = ΘvH ∪ΘvS ;
MV = {m1, m2, . . . , m30, m31};
⊕, ↓: evidential operations.
The EN is illustrated in Figure 3, where each variable in the
EN (v ∈ V ) is represented by circular nodes, while the mass
functions of MV are indicated by the diamond shaped signs
(note that the mass functions in the node status subtree occur
twice; therefore, 31 mass functions are present in the EN). The
node status is inferred for HMI and CTL (see Sect. 3) with
a subnetwork of the same structure. Only the sensor evidence
varies. The variables with explanation and frame definitions
are listed in Table 2. Each mass function is connected by edges
to the subset of variables, which define its domain. Any pair
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Table 2: Variables of the node status model.
Variables Description Frame Explanation
CS ControlStatus {0, 1, 2} 0 normal, 1 erroneous,
2 malicious;
MAN Manipulation {0, 1} 0 normal, 1 manipulat.
MITM MITM {0, 1} 0 normal, 1 mitm
EPR ErrPackRec {0, 1} 0 false, 1 true
MAC MAC change {0, 1} 0 false, 1 true
ARV ARP victim {0, 1} 0 false, 1 true
NS NodeStatus {0, 1, 2} 0 normal, 1 erroneous,
2 malicious;
CM Compromised {0, 1} 0 false, 1 true;
EP ErrPacket {0, 1} 0 false, 1 true;
SP Spoofing {0, 1} 0 false, 1 true;
MW Malware {0, 1} 0 false, 1 true;
PE PrivEsc {0, 1} 0 false, 1 true;
AV sensorAntivirus {0, 1} 0 inactive, 1 active;
HI sensorHID {0, 1} 0 inactive, 1 active;
NI sensorNID {0, 1} 0 inactive, 1 active;
AR sensorARP {0, 1} 0 inactive, 1 active.
of variables that are not directly connected are assumed to
be conditionally independent. The domain of interest for the
problem is the domain D0 = {CS,MAN}. The two variables
describe the control status (normal, erroneous or malicious)
and the knowledge about manipulations of the communication
between the controller (CTL) and the inverter (INV ). This
information is sufficient to identify the four states of interest
in the use-case, as defined in Sect. 3.
6.3 Domain Knowledge
The EN represents the knowledge about the causal relation-
ships between its variables that are described by relation
implication rules. The rules are defined based on expert
knowledge and then transformed into the mass functions
m1, m2, . . . , m13, according to Equation 6 in Section 4.3. If
more than one rule defines a relationship, the resulting mass
functions are combined, as shown by Equation 3. Table 3 lists
the mass functions and corresponding relation implication
rules for sensor mappings. The rules are based on the sensor
reliabilities discussed in Sect. 6.1. The remaining relation
implication rules are provided in the Appendix.
In the following, the relationship between the HIDS sensor
(variable HI) and the knowledge that privilege escalation was
performed (PE) will be used as an example to demonstrate
the complete inference process based on the presented con-
cepts. In order to design the relation implication rule, a-priori
knowledge about the sensor reliability from Sect. 6.1 is used.
For a realistic sensor, a TPR of 30% and a FPR of 5% are
given. Through Eq. 14 the PPV is computed as follows:
PPV (HI = 1) = 0.30.3 + 0.05 ≈ 0.86
PPV (HI = 0) = 0.950.95 + 0.7 ≈ 0.58
The discussion in Sect. 5.2 states that this information cannot
be used directly for the confidence in the relation implication
rule. Instead, Eq. 11 needs to be applied to retrieve the correct
confidence.
α(HI = 1) = PPV − 1− PPV2− 1 ≈ 0.86−
1− 0.86
1 = 0.72
α(HI = 0) = PPV − 1− PPV2− 1 ≈ 0.58−
1− 0.58
1 = 0.16
Table 3: Mass functions and corresponding relation implica-
tion rules for sensor mappings.
Mass functions Relationships in rules
m4 Relationships of EPR with NI@INV:
(NI@INV = 1)⇒ (EPR = 1)
with confidence between probable and 1;
(NI@INV = 0)⇒ (EPR = 0)
with confidence between probable and 1;
m5,m6 Relationships of MAC with ARV:
(ARV = 1)⇒ (MAC = 1)
with confidence between verylikely and 1;
(ARV = 1)⇒ (MAC = 1)
with confidence between verylikely and 1;
m10,m24 Relationships of MW with AV:
(AV = 1)⇒ (MW = 1) with confidence 1.0;
(AV = 0)⇒ (MW = 0)
with confidence between 0.92 and 1.
m11,m25 Relationships of PE with HI:
(HI = 1)⇒ (PE = 1)
with confidence between 0.72 and 1;
(HI = 0)⇒ (PE = 0)
with confidence between 0.16 and 1.
m12,m26 Relationships of SP with AR:
(AR = 1)⇒ (SP = 1) with confidence 1.0;
(AR = 0)⇒ (SP = 0) with confidence 1.0.
m13,m27 Relationships of EP with NI:
(NI = 1)⇒ (EP = 1)
with confidence between likely and 1;
(NI = 0)⇒ (EP = 0)
with confidence between likely and 1.
These values are then used to form the relation implication
rules for m11 (see also Tab. 3). Each of the two rules can be
represented by a mass function over the domain {PE, HI},
namely ma11 and mb11. Take the first implication rule as an
example,
(HI = 1)⇒ (PE = 1)
with confidence between 0.72 and 1.
To represent this rule in the format given in Equation 6, we
have
DA = {HI}, ΘDA = {0, 1}, A = 1, Ac = 0;
DB = {PE}, ΘDB = {0, 1}, B = 1, Bc = 0;
α = 0.72, β = 1.
Applying Equation 7, ma11 can be calculated as follows:
ma11({(1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 0)}) = 0.72
ma11({(1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 0)}) = 1− 0.72 = 0.28
Similarly, mb11 is calculated as follows:
mb11({(0, 0), (1, 1), (0, 1)}) = 0.16
mb11({(1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 0)}) = 1− 0.16 = 0.84
When the two mass functions are combined using Dempster’s
rule in Equation 3, we obtain the mass function m11 = ma11 ⊕
mb11, which represents the domain knowledge and is in the
product space ΘPE ×ΘHI :
m11({(0, 0), (1, 1)}) = 0.1152
m11({(0, 0), (1, 1), (0, 1)}) = 0.0448
m11({(0, 0), (1, 1), (1, 0)}) = 0.6048
m11({(0, 0), (1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1)}) = 0.2352
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7 Evaluation
The evaluation of the presented approach is based on 60
scenarios that represent different system states. A detailed
description of the scenarios is given in Sect. 7.1. Based on
these scenarios, three aspects of the proposed evidential net-
work approach are evaluated. First, the accuracy of the pre-
sented evidential network is compared to a reasoning approach
based on classical Bayesian probabilities (i.e., the alternative
approach does not take uncertainty into account). Further
the assumptions made by Ou et al. [15] regarding the use of
discrete scales to describe the confidence in the relationships
between variables is evaluated in Sect. 7.3. The final part
of the evaluation concerns the correct integration of sensor
evidence, based on a-priori knowledge about sensor reliability
(see Sect. 7.4).
7.1 Evaluation Setup
To evaluate the performance of the presented evidential net-
work (EN), the EN is executed over 60 different scenarios.
The scenarios differ only in the states that each sensor vari-
able is in. More specifically, the results are not retrieved by
monitoring a real system under attack (e.g., no real traffic
is monitored). Instead, the 60 specific scenarios (i.e., various
sensor states) are derived manually from seven core scenarios.
This approach is deliberate and necessary; the goal of the
evaluation is to make an assessment of the abilities of the
EN to correctly identify the system state based on sensor
evidence. The accuracy of the EN – defined by the TPR and
FPR of the detection of each state of interest – highly depends
on the performance of the sensors. Therefore, it is essential
to have full control over the sensors themselves, which is not
possible with a real setup. Instead, a real setup would result
in less expressive results. An unexpected error in the state
detected by a sensor would influence the accuracy of the EN;
the results would show the accuracy of the EN under a specific
set of sensors, rather than the characteristic of the EN itself.
However, it is of interest how the EN reacts to changes in
sensor performance. The expected reliability of a sensor is en-
coded in the relation implication rules that specify the sensor
mapping. The question to answer is, how the performance of
the EN changes if the trust in a set of sensors changes. There-
fore, Sect. 6.1 introduced different a-priori probabilities of the
sensor reliability for the antivirus scanner (AV) and the host
IDS (HI). To evaluate the change in accuracy of the EN due to
changes in sensor reliability the sensor reliabilities are varied
in every evaluation. Section 6.1 provided a-priori probabilities
for antivirus scanners and host IDS systems. Table 4 shows
the lower confidence level (i.e., α) of the respective relation
implication rules in each of the nine configurations.
The seven core scenario descriptions are provided in the
following. For each core scenario the number of derived sce-
narios and the expected state (i.e., ground truth) are given.
HMI, CTL and INV refer to the nodes in the use-case, as
defined in Sect. 3. CS and MAN represent the two variables
in the domain of interest (D0), namely the control status and
the manipulation of the network (see Tab. 2 in Sect. 6).
• Normal Operation Everything works as expected,
but different sensors might issue false positives.
Scenarios: 4
Expected: CS = 0, MAN = 0
• Attack HMI (I) The attacker infects the HMI with
malware. From there, a man-in-the-middle (MITM)
attack is launched on the communication between
the substation controller (CTL) and the PV inverter
(INV ). With the successful MITM attack, the ac-
tive power setpoint is changed to a value < 10%.
To disguise the location of the attack, the attacker
might spoof the source of the setpoint packet or the
parameters of the ARP packets sent to perform the
MITM attack. However, the host IDS and the malware
scanner pick up on the infection of HMI.
Scenarios: 14
Expected: CS = 0, MAN = 0
• Attack HMI (II) The attack is performed like de-
scribed in the previous scenario. However, the Host
IDS is not able to detect any form of privilege esca-
lation. Further, the antivirus scanner might be unable
to detect the malware (False Negative). (The attacker
still aims to disguise the location of the attack on a
network level)
Scenarios: 10
Expected: CS = 0, MAN = 1
• Attack HMI (III) The attack is similar to the
previous scenarios. However, the attacker successfully
disguises the location of the attack completely (i.e.,
no alert indicates any malfunctioning of HMI ). Only
changes in the ARP table and the fact that erroneous
packets are received are detected.
Scenarios: 3
Expected: CS = 0, MAN = 1
• Masquerade as Controller The attacker again in-
fects HMI to manipulate the communication. In this
scenario, to hide the real location of the attack, the
attacker replaces HMI ’s addresses with the controller’s
addresses to indicate that the controller is the source
of the attack or at least the source of the erroneous
packets received by the PV inverter. The goal for
the EN is to detect that the controller is working as
expected.
Scenarios: 14
Expected: CS = 0, MAN = 1
• Controller Error The controller acts erroneously and
sends active power setpoints< 10% to the PV inverter.
This might be caused by human error or a software
bug. At the same time, false positives from other
sensors might indicate attack behavior that should be
correctly discarded.
Scenarios: 4
Expected: CS = 1, MAN = 0
• Controller Attack The attacker was able to infect
the controller directly (either through lateral move-
ment or directly from an external network). It is now
possible to send erroneous packets directly without the
use of a MITM attack.
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Table 4: Nine different configurations of sensor reliability. (The values for each configuration specify the lower confidence bound for the
respective relation implication rule specified in Tab. 3. The rules that formm10 andm11 describe the reliability of HI and AV respectively.)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ma10 0.72 0.2 0.92 0.72 0.2 0.92 0.72 0.2 0.92
mb10 0.16 0.02 0.32 0.16 0.02 0.32 0.16 0.02 0.32
ma11 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.3 0.3 0.3 1 1 1
mb11 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.92 0.92 0.92
Scenarios: 10
Expected: CS = 2, MAN = 0
To evaluate the performance of the evidential network in
different configurations, each scenario is evaluated and the
result is compared to the expected result from the respective
core scenario. Subsequently, TPR and FPR are computed for
each variable state of the two variables in D0 separately. This
approach is necessary to evaluate the detection accuracy with
respect to each system state. To be correctly detected, the
pignistic transform (see Eq. 8 in Sect. 4.4) of the expected
variable state has to be 10% above the pignistic probability
for any other variable state of the same variable. Otherwise,
the evaluation is counted as a false negative for the expected
state and a false positive for any state with a pignistic
probability above that threshold. Our research showed that
this threshold is appropriate. System states are not always
completely clear and the same set of sensor states can have
different causes. Therefore, it is desirable that the results are
somewhat ambiguous in some states.
7.2 Comparison to Bayesien Networks
Two approaches based on classic Bayesian reasoning have
been implemented to provide a comparison for the perfor-
mance of the EN presented in Sect. 3.2. To this extent,
relation implication rules that form the evidential network
are transformed in two ways to remove uncertainty from the
reasoning process. Given a general relation implication rule
(see Sect. 4.2), the degree of uncertainty is given by β − α.
This probability needs to be reassigned with the introduction
of additional relation implication rules so that β = α for every
relation implication rule in the EN. Given a general rule (see
Eq. 6 in Sect. 4 it is replaced by |ΘB | rules; one rule for each
focal element in the implied domain. The question then is
about the confidence placed in each rule.
In the first approach α1 = α/|B| and α2 = (β − α)/|ΘB \
B|, where α1 is the confidence in all rules where B′ ∈ B and
α2 is the confidence in all rules where B′ /∈ B. We will call this
approach Bayes for the rest of this work.
The second approach introduces the same number of vari-
ables, but assigns different confidences in each rule. It is based
on the computation of the pignistic transformation (see Eq.
8 in Sect. 4.4) and divides uncertainty equally between all
variable states. In this approach α1 = α/|B| + (β − α)/|ΘB |
and α2 = (β − α)/|ΘB |.
Consider the following example for relation implication
rule ma10 given in Tab. 3 in Sect. 3.2.
(HI = 1)⇒ (PE = 1)
with confidence between 0.72 and 1.
In Bayesian reasoning it would be replaced by two rules to
remove uncertainty.
(HI = 1)⇒ (PE = 1) with confidence 0.72.
(HI = 1)⇒ (PE = 0) with confidence 0.28.
Note that ΘB = ΘPE = {0, 1} and B = {1}. Similarly, the
BetP conversion would replace ma10 with two rules as well.
However, their confidence would be different.
(HI = 1)⇒ (PE = 1) with confidence 0.86.
(HI = 1)⇒ (PE = 0) with confidence 0.14.
Figure 4 shows the TPR and FPR for each variable state in
D0 and for each sensor reliability case in Tab. 4. The results
show that the EN can detect all system states of interest with
good accuracy. The TPR is (with some exceptions, based on
sensor reliability) around 80% and the FPR below 20% (for
many states even below 10%). These are very good results
considering that for some results only limited sensor evidence
is available. Further, as argued previously in Sect. 3, the same
sensor evidence can indicate various higher level states; some
degree of uncertainty is therefore wanted. While a completely
accurate detection would be desirable, the results show that
the presented approach is able to indicate if sensor evidence
is not sufficient to make clear statements about the causality.
This is indicated by a moderate FPR. Given the way TPR
and FPR are computed, this also explains why the TPR is not
higher.
The steep rise in the TPR of erroneous control state
detection (i.e., CS = 1), as well as the dip in malicious control
state detection, is a result of the changes in sensor reliability.
In Tab. 4 it is shown that the reliability of both AV and HI in
normal states is lowest in configuration 1 and 2; for malicious
detection it is lowest in configuration 4 and 5. Therefore, it
can be concluded that the accuracy of the EN depends on
the reliability of the sensors. However, the unreliability of one
sensor can be compensated for by other sensors. This is shown
by the fact that only the configurations where both sensors
perform worst show a significant change in detection rates.
What is more, in comparison to the two Bayes approaches,
the proposed evidential network can compete through all
states. The Bayes transformation is unable to detect any case
of CS = 0 or CS = 1. It highly overfits to malicious control
behavior.
The BetP transformation is much more accurate than
the Bayesian approach over all system states. The similarity
of the results to those of the EN is expected; the use of
the pignistic transformation on all relation implication rules
already makes use of DS theory, and considers the uncertainty
of the relationships. There is no state where this approach
shows notable improvements over the evidential network.
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Figure 4: Comparative study of EN performance.(Each figure presents the detection accuracy with respect to one specific variable state.
They show the TPR and FPR of the compared approaches on the y-axis. The different sensor reliability configurations (see Tab. 4) that are
evaluated are shown on the x-axis.)
Furthermore, with increasing sensor reliability, the accuracy
in erroneous state detection improves for the EN, while no
such effect can be seen for the BetP transformation. This is a
key finding. Evidential networks enable a much more intuitive
design of the knowledge base. But even if this intuitive design
is used to derive Bayesian relation rules, the inference process
of the EN results in higher accuracy. Finally, the results from
the EN are initially given in DS belief structures that provide
additional information to traditional Bayesian probabilities.
Only for this evaluation the belief structures are put through
the pignistic transformation to make the results comparable.
This additional information is lost when Bayesian reasoning
is used.
7.3 Evaluation of Different Confidence Scales
In Sect. 5.1, the concept of scales was introduced to sim-
plify the design of relation implication rules. This evaluation
considers the impact that the number of elements in these
scales has on the EN’s accuracy. In work by Ou et al. [15],
the authors claim that the reliability placed on rules in
intrusion detection systems can be accurately classified by
a scale of four elements. This approach was later adopted
by Zomlot et al. [11] in the context of DS theory for alert
correlation. Figure 5 shows TPR and FPR for each variable
state in D0, but with relation implication rules of different
confidences (based on the scale used). The results show no
conclusive evidence, that a higher number of elements in the
scale results in consistently better results. The detection rates
for CS = 0 (normal operation) are stable through all nine
sensor reliability combinations. While the five element scale
appears more accurate with lower sensor reliability for CS = 1
(shown by the steeper rise) it performs consistently worse in
detection of MAN = 0 (absence of manipulation) than the
other two scales, and produces a higher false positive rate for
MAN = 1. However, the four element scale does not show the
same decrease in accuracy that we would expect if the cause
would be the number of elements in the scale.
However, the results do show that the design of the relation
implication rules is very critical to system performance. For
fine grained relationships, a scale with more elements can
make it easier during the design process to accurately model
causality.
7.4 Sensor Mapping Evaluation
The final evaluation considers the integration of sensor evi-
dence in the EN. Section 5.2 presented a set of rules that can
be applied to transfer Bayesian a-priori probabilities about
sensor reliability into relation implication rules. Furthermore,
Sect. 5.3 applied these rules to IT security sensors, which are
traditionally evaluated through TPR and FPR. Figure 6 com-
pares the performance of the EN when sensors are integrated
the way it is suggested in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 to two other
approaches. In the BetP approach, the relation implication
rules used to map the sensor evidence are strictly Bayesian.
The mapping is performed according to the transformation
introduced as BetP in Sect. 7.2 (see also Sect. 7.3 for details
about the transformation of relationship rules).
The third approach (called Alert-Only) was presented by
Zomlot et al. [11]. The authors claim that IDS rules are
designed only to detect a specific condition. An alert from that
rule can be an indicator for a specific (often malicious) behav-
ior. However, the absence of an alert has to be considered
completely irrelevant. The argument is that the rules are not
designed to detect the absence of attacks and should therefore
not be used to provide evidence for anything else than attacks.
As an example, consider again an original relation implication
rule: mb10.
(HI = 0)⇒ (PE = 0)
with confidence between 0.16 and 1.
This rule would be eliminated in this approach because the
absence of an alert HI = 0 provides evidence about a system
state.
Figure 6 show the evaluation results in comparison. While
the detection rates of CS = 0 are consistent among the
different sensor mapping methods, significant performance
differences can be seen for CS = 1 and CS = 2. The
Alert-Only mapping highly overfits towards the detection of
malicious states. Only malicous control behavior and com-
munication manipulations are detected; all other states have
a TPR of 0, which is not acceptable. Additionally, the FPR
for malicious states is consistently higher than those of other
approaches. This result can be expected because the approach
ignores information about normal behavior.
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Figure 5: Evaluation of scales of different size for the relation implication rule design process (see Tab. 1).(Each figure presents
the detection accuracy with respect to one specific variable state. They show the TPR and FPR of the compared approaches on the y-axis. The
different sensor reliability configurations (see Tab. 4) that are evaluated are shown on the x-axis.)
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Figure 6: Evaluation of different approaches to integrate sensor evidence based on sensor reliability. (Each figure presents the
detection accuracy with respect to one specific variable state. They show the TPR and FPR of the compared approaches on the y-axis. The
different sensor reliability configurations (see Tab. 4) that are evaluated are shown on the x-axis.)
The performance of the BetP mapping approach is sim-
ilar to the DS approach for the detection of manipulations.
However, the BetP approach for sensor integration is unable
to detect erroneous behavior in the controller. To detect all
possible states in a system (normal, erroneous and malicious),
the sensor integration approach that is presented in this work
shows the best results.
7.5 Summary
The presented evaluation shows that evidential networks
provide a very suitable solution to state inference in cyber-
physical systems. The accuracy of ENs is at least equal to
that of reasoning approaches with classical probabilities, but
with several proven practical benefits. First, the design of the
EN through relation implication rules is much more intuitive,
because uncertainty about the encoded relationships can be
considered. This design process can be further simplified
with the use of confidence scales. Where previous work [15],
[11] lacked clear information on the relative performance of
confidence scales, this work has experimentally compared a
range of previously proposed scales in practice. We show that
the number of elements in the scale has no significant impact
on the accuracy of the EN (see Sect. 5.1 and 7.3). Further,
the results of the state inference is given in belief structures,
rather than classical probabilities. These belief structures
provide more information, because they represent the level of
uncertainty in the results but can, at the same time, estimate
classical probabilities. The degree of uncertainty provides
information about the level of trust that can be placed in the
inferred results; something that can increase the acceptance
of the solution for operators. Finally, we were able to show
that the way in which sensor evidence is considered in ENs is
critical to their performance. Following a detailed discussion,
we were able to provide a generalized solution how knowledge
about sensor reliability should be leveraged in an EN in Sect.
5.2. In Sect. 7.4, we were able to show that this approach led
to a high increase in detection accuracy when compared to
approaches from related work (see [11], [14], [21]).
8 Conclusion
This work proposes evidential networks for state inference in
cyber-physical systems. State inference aims to identify the
causality between low-level evidence and higher-level system
states. This goes beyond the goals of most widely adopted
correlation techniques (see Sect. 2 and [7]), and is critical to
support control decisions of human operators or automated
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algorithms in systems of ever increasing complexity. The pre-
sented results show that evidential networks are an improve-
ment on approaches that use classical Bayesian probabilities
to describe confidence in hypotheses (see [7], [21], [20]). They
allow a more intuitive design of the system model with the use
of uncertain information. In addition to a representation of the
results in the classical probability domain, belief structures
also provide information about the degree of certainty in these
probabilities. This is useful for decision makers, because it
provides a measure for the trust that can be placed in the
results. At the same time, experimental results show that the
detection accuracy is better or comparable with approaches
that perform reasoning with Bayesian probabilities.
Although this work evaluates evidential networks on a
single use-case, we argue in Sect. 3 that the use-case inves-
tigated experimentally is representative of a wide range of
CPS. It covers general problems for state inference in cyber-
physical systems, such as different sensor types or system-
specific thresholds that lead to specialized system states. At
the same time, the use-case is not artificially designed – it was
shown by Kang et al. [2] that it is based on a number of real
world scenarios.
Solutions for state inference are of vital importance for
an informed, timely and accurate response by operators in
systems of increasing complexity. We argue that dependable
operation of cyber-physical systems requires a holistic view on
sensor evidence and system states that is able to accurately
differentiate between normal operation, specific error states
and specific attack states. This work shows that EN provides
better visibility about complex system states, which is a
requirement for more accurate control decisions.
Appendix
The following table completes the relation implication rules
that form the knowledge base in the evidential network (see
Sect. 3.2 for details).
Mass Relationships in rules
m1 Relationships of CS with EPR, MAC@CTL, NS@HMI
and NS@CTL:
(NS@CTL = 0)⇒ (CS = 0)
with confidence between verylikely and 1;
(NS@CTL = 1)⇒ (CS = 1)
with confidence between likely and 1;
(NS@CTL = 2)⇒ (CS = 2)
with confidence between likely and 1;
(MAC@CTL = 1)⇒ (CS ∈ {0, 1})
with confidence between likely and 1;
(NS@HMI = 2)⇒ (CS = 0)
with confidence between improbable and 1;
(EPR = 1,MAC@CTL = 0)⇒ (CS ∈ {1, 2})
with confidence between feasible and 1;
(EPR = 1,MAC@CTL = 1)⇒ (CS = 0)
with confidence between feasible and 1;
(EPR = 1,MAC@CTL = 1, NS@HMI = 2)⇒ (CS = 0)
with confidence between probable and 1;
(EPR = 1,MAC@CTL = 0, NS@HMI ∈ {0, 1})
⇒ (CS ∈ {1, 2})
with confidence between verylikely and 1;
(EPR = 0)⇒ (CS ∈ {0})
with confidence between potentially and 1;
m2 Relationships of MAN with MITM, EPR, and NS@HMI:
(NS@HMI = 2)⇒ (MAN = 1)
with confidence between feasible and 1;
(NS@HMI ∈ {0, 1})⇒ (MAN = 0)
with confidence between improbable and 1;
(MITM = 1)⇒ (MAN = 1)
with confidence between probable and 1;
(EPR = 1)⇒ (MAN = 1)
with confidence between potentially and 1;
(EPR = 0)⇒ (MAN = 0)
with confidence between verylikely and 1;
(MITM = 0, NS@HMI ∈ {0, 1})⇒ (MAN = 0)
with confidence between likely and 1;
m3 Relationships of MITM with MAC@CTL and MAC@INV:
(MAC@CTL = 1,MAC@INV = 0)⇒ (MITM = 1)
with confidence between potentially and 1;
(MAC@CTL = 0,MAC@INV = 1)⇒ (MITM = 1)
with confidence between potentially and 1;
(MAC@CTL = 0,MAC@INV = 0)⇒ (MITM = 0)
with confidence between probable and 1;
(MAC@CTL = 1,MAC@INV = 1)⇒ (MITM = 1)
with confidence between probable and 1;
m7,m21 Relationships of NS with CM, EP, and SP :
(CM = 1)⇒ (NS = 2)
with confidence between verylikely and 1;
(CM = 0)⇒ (NS ∈ {0, 1})
with confidence between likely and 1;
(SP = 1)⇒ (NS = 2)
with confidence between verylikely and 1;
(SP = 0)⇒ (NS ∈ {0, 1})
with confidence between potentially and 1;
(EP = 1)⇒ (NS ∈ {1, 2})
with confidence between probable and 1;
(EP = 0)⇒ (NS = 0)
with confidence between potentially and 1;
(CM = 1, SP = 1, EP = 1)⇒ (NS = 2)
with confidence between probable and 1;
(CM = 0, SP = 0, EP = 1)⇒ (NS = 1)
with confidence between probable and 1;
(CM = 0, SP = 0, EP = 0)⇒ (NS = 0)
with confidence between probable and 1.
m8,m22 Relationships of CM with MW:
(MW = 1)⇒ (CM = 1)
with confidence between likely and 1;
(MW = 0)⇒ (CM = 0)
with confidence between improbable and 1.
m9,m23 Relationships of CM with PE:
(PE = 1)⇒ (CM = 1)
with confidence between possible and 1;
(PE = 0)⇒ (CM = 0)
with confidence between improbable and 1.
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